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Abstract
This paper presents a cross-sectional examination of the implementation conditions
within Michigan during the first year following the passage of federal welfare reform. It asks the
question, “Do implementation factors in the welfare system quantitatively influence the
achievement of public policy goals?” Drawing on data from 82 counties, this analysis provides
an exploratory, multivariate model that controls for environmental factors outside of the
influence of program implementers and examines the effects of macro- and microimplementation conditions on an outcome desired by policy reforms. The results suggest that
implementation factors do have a statistically discernible relationship to proportion of a county’s
caseload that is combining welfare and work.

Implications are considered both for the

implementation of policy reforms and future research in this area.
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Introduction
Even before the passage of the federal Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity
Reconciliation Act (PRWORA), which devolved additional responsibilities to states and ended
the entitlement to cash assistance, there was considerable variation in the administration of
welfare programs in this country. States established their own benefit levels, eligibility rules, and
administrative systems. Waivers of federal regulations were common and state’s experimented
with a range of policy innovations and welfare-to-work programs (Wiseman 1993). Because of
this diversity, a considerable body of research literature was focused on conditions in states and
localities to document how welfare and welfare-to-work programs were actually implemented
(Brodkin 1986, 1997; Corbett 1994/95; Hagan, Lurie, and Wang 1993; Hasenfeld and Weaver
1996; Kane and Bane 1994; Meyers, Glaser, and MacDonald 1998; Miller 1991; Pavetti and
Duke 1995; Riccio and Hasenfeld 1996; author 1997; Wiseman 1996). Using both qualitative
and quantitative methodology, these studies paint a rich picture of how public policy is translated
into complex organizational rules, contradictory case worker practices, and diverse program
models. Although many of these studies were conducted before the passage of federal welfare
reform in 1996, the documented diversity in program implementation is only increasing given the
latitude granted to states by the Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF) block grant
(Gallagher et al. 1998; Holcomb et al. 1998; Nathan and Gais 1998).
These past studies of the welfare system clearly establish how implementation is
important–it shapes which organizations are involved in service provision, institutes the
techniques which are adapted to move clients into work, and determines which staff interact with

clients. These studies also establish why implementation is important. Implementation determines
the messages conveyed to clients about the expectation of the state and the ingredients of formal
policy. Given the multiple goals embedded in reform legislation, the implementation process
also provides a way that these contradictions are ultimate reconciled (Brodkin 1987, 1990;
Hasenfeld 1997). While these studies add important knowledge about the welfare system, it is
also important to know what effect implementation decisions have on important policy outcomes.
The existing research on welfare policy outcomes primarily has tried to understand how
socio-demographic, economic, and policy factors influence the timing and duration of
individuals’ dependence on the welfare system (Bane and Ellwood 1994; Duncan and Hoffman
1988; Moffit 1992). These micro-level investigations have yielded valuable insight into welfare
dynamics and the intergenerational transmission of dependency.

However, data limitations

prohibit such studies from exploring whether the contact that individual clients have with the
welfare system influences the length of dependence upon public assistance, the probability of
combining welfare and work, or the ability to leave the rolls. Formal evaluations of state
experimentation before the passage of PRWORA, however, reveal that service delivery
approaches have discernible impacts on the employment rates, client earnings and welfare
payments (Gueron and Pauly 1991; Martinson 1995). These evaluation studies, though, do not
look in detail how variations in policy and program implementation could influence policy
outcomes.
In this paper, I introduce exploratory models to examine what effect implementation
factors have on policy outcomes, using cross-sectional information gathered from all counties in
Michigan. Rather than drawing on data from particular local sites, this paper looks across one
state to investigate how variations in implementation conditions are relate to counties’ abilities to
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move welfare recipients into the labor market. In particular, this paper explores the question:
“Do implementation factors in the welfare system quantitatively influence the achievement of
this public policy goal?”

Accounting for environmental factors outside of the control of

implementing agents, I look at the macro and micro-implementation decisions made in
Michigan’s service delivery system and explore whether or not these factors have a discernible
effect on policy goals.

Conceptual Framework and Prior Research
The field of policy implementation research is bereft of conceptual clarity. Multiple
theoretical models posit competing hypotheses about important predictive factors, significant
inter-organizational processes, and, even, evaluative criteria for determining the success and
failure of policy implementation (Ingram 1990; Matland 1995; Palumbo and Calista 1990).
Scholars can agree, however, that implementation conditions arise from both from the design of
policy and the institutional settings within which policy is applied (Bardach 1977; Goggin et al.
1990; Lipsky 1980; Mazmanian and Sabatier 1989; Pressman and Wildavsky 1973).

In

attempting to explore what affect various implementation forces have on welfare policy
outcomes, I draw upon a distinction made by Berman (1978) and Palumbo and Calista (1990).
They suggest that institutional settings influence implementation at both the macro- and microlevels.
At the macro-level, the federal or state governments establish the general parameters
within which social programs are carried out. When the implementation of social programs is
centralized in public bureaucracies, this involves setting funding levels, allocating human
resources, and writing administrative rules and regulations. Yet, in the late 1990s, it is rare for
public bureaucracies to be the primary agents responsible for implementing social programs. In
3

fact, as multiple organizations have become involved in the delivery of social policy (Provan and
Milward 1993; Smith and Lipsky 1993), macro-implementation factors have become more varied
and complex.

Through negotiating with various state agencies, establishing contracts with

private organizations, and developing performance criteria, state-level managers try to influence
the local organizations that deliver public policy and encourage them to behave in desired ways.
In the implementation of welfare programs, this can include such things as increasing the number
of welfare-to-work providers in a given region, selecting certain counties to receive extra
resources, or contracting with particular types of agencies to operate welfare-to-work programs.1
Much of the early evidence about the implementation of the federal TANF program are
examinations of state, macro-implementation factors (Gallagher et al. 1998; Holcomb et al. 1998;
Nathan and Gais 1998).
At the micro-level of implementation, the organizations that deliver public policy react to
the new responsibilities they are being given. Managers and staff in these local organizations
make decisions about how service technology, organizational processes, and daily practices
should be adapted given the contours of new policy guidelines.

Significant research has

documented that these micro-changes rarely conform to the expectations of either policy makers
or macro-level implementers (Brodkin 1997; Kane and Bane 1994; Meyers et al. 1998, Pavetti
and Duke, 1995). As is true for macro-implementation factors, when decentralized, private
organizations are responsible for implementing social programs, the diversity of microimplementation conditions expands.

If there is little programmatic guidance–as is true for

Michigan’s welfare-to-work programs–local organizations are free to establish for themselves all
elements of service technology. Local welfare-to-work organizations decide whether or not to
hold workshops job search techniques, pick the topics to be included in such sessions, and elect
whether or not to offer on-going support to clients actively searching for work.
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Although not explicitly focused on assessing whether macro- and micro-implementation
factors are quantitatively related to policy goals, a few past studies of welfare administration
resemble this paper because they seek to understand the relationship between program delivery
and policy outcomes. During a prior embodiment of welfare-to-work, Mitchell, Chadwin and
Nightingale (1980) explored how the administration of the Work Incentive (WIN) Program2
influenced state and local performance. After examining the environmental, managerial and
service delivery characteristics, the authors concluded that while socio-economic factors outside
the control of managers or staff accounted for between 21 to 43 percent of the variance in
selected policy outcomes, other factors within the control of state administrators and local
program operators were equally important in determining clients’ entry wages and job retention
rates.
In a number of studies, Lawrence Mead also has explored how administrative decisions
influence the attainment of policy goals. Examining data from the implementation of WIN in
New York State, Mead (1983, 1985) concluded that administrative conditions–such as the
assignment of client to various service components, the mandatory-nature of participation, and
the amount of staff–were just as significant as demographic or labor market characteristics in
influencing the number of welfare recipients who find work or remain working after 30 days.
Similar findings hold in an analysis of the administration of WIN in all 50 states (Mead 1988).
In more recent work, Mead (1997) asserts that this approach–where the unit of analysis is
the program rather than welfare clients–will become increasingly important in this era of policy
devolution.

As state and local experimentation with various techniques for getting welfare

recipients into the labor market increases, the “black box” of implementation becomes even more
significant.

In this paper, Mead presents data from 72 counties in Wisconsin during the

implementation of the Job Opportunity and Basic Skills program3 and explores the relationship
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between administrative conditions and a number of policy outcomes, including the proportion of
clients working and the proportion retaining jobs for 30 and 180 days. While the statistical
significance of various predictors varies by outcome, this analysis provides additional evidence
that the decisions made by administrators concerning the type and intensity of welfare-to-work
services has a quantifiable impact on policy outcomes.
Mead uses these findings to argue for the imposition of mandatory participation in job
search or work for welfare recipients. An evaluation of California’s welfare-to-work program
Riccio and Hasenfeld (1996), however, documents that while compliance techniques used in
local programs–the imposition of sanctions or personalized attention–has some affect on clients
participation in work requirements and AFDC savings, the relationship is not as strong as
proponents of mandatory participation would assert. None-the-less, this paper and others by
Hasenfeld (Hasenfeld and Weaver 1996) document that the way program components are
implemented at the local level has a statistically discernible effect on important policy outcomes,
such as client participation in job search programs.
Thus, prior research on the welfare system does suggest that macro- and microimplementation factors may, in fact, have statistically discernible impact on policy outcomes.
This paper builds upon this prior work with data gathered from each county in Michigan during
fiscal year 1997.

Research Context
During the 1996 national debates over welfare reform, Michigan emerged as a state
exemplar of substantive welfare reform. Like other states, Michigan had taken advantage of the
waiver of federal AFDC regulations in the early 1990s and instituted a series of programmatic
and policy changes.

These early choices set Michigan on a path that stresses clients’
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combination of welfare and work rather than reducing the welfare roles. The state has not
adopted policies that divert potential clients from the welfare rolls or instituted time limits shorter
than required by federal legislation; many changes in eligibility rules and program operation were
implemented in the early 1990s and were designed to “make work pay,” such as larger disregards
of earned income and the elimination of the restrictions on the amount certain families could
work. Although the state did institute sanctions for clients who did not comply with new work or
job search requirements, the implementation of sanctions has been minimal throughout the state.4
In Michigan, the policy “carrots” to encourage work have been larger than the “sticks” requiring
them to leave the rolls.
In 1994, Michigan moved from welfare-to-work model that stressed education to a quick
labor force attachment model, called Work First. Work First programs are focused on moving
welfare recipients into the labor market rather than on making them self-sufficient.

As a

technical manual designed to help states implement a Work First approach summarizes,
“… [A]ny job is a good job. The best way to succeed in the labor market is to join it, developing
work habits and skills on the job rather than in a classroom” (Brown 1997). Like many other
state, administrative responsibility for the new program was taken from the state’s public welfare
agency and shifted to a new, economic and workforce development agency to be consistent with
this philosophy (Nathan and Gais 1998).
Suddenly, many diverse organizations were involved in Michigan’s welfare system.
County offices of the public welfare bureaucracy retained their roles of determining and reevaluating eligibility for public assistance programs. A decentralized quasi-governmental system
previously responsible for the Job Training and Partnership Act (JTPA) was given authority to
issue contracts for Work First with private and public organizations. Minimal programmatic
oversight was granted and, as a consequence, each Work First contractor provides distinct
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services to move recipients into jobs (Seefeldt, Sandfort and Danziger 1998). These conditions
provide growing evidence that “devolution” in the welfare system has meant more than shifting
responsibilities from federal to state governments (Gallagher et al. 1998; Nathan and Gais 1998).
“Second order devolution” is occurring with incredible variation at the county or sub-county
level.
The combination of these policy and administrative changes allowed Michigan to apply
for TANF funds after the passage of federal welfare reform and to become one of the first states
receiving these funds in October 1996. The data examined in this paper were gathered from all
Michigan counties during this first year of operation under the new TANF program, from
October 1996 to September 1997. While the results are not strictly generalizable to other states
because of the diversity of implementation conditions, this analysis does suggest that the choices
made by implementing agents–both at the state and local levels–may have a quantifiable impact
on policy goals.

Research Methodology
This paper presents a cross-sectional examination of 82 counties in Michigan during the
first year following the passage of PRWORA. Wayne County was excluded from this analysis
because initial exploration of this data-set determined that it was an outlier on the independent
variables included in this model. Wayne County is the site of Detroit and had, in 1994, a
population of 2.1 million. The large population makes the service delivery context of the county
unique. It has, for example, 26 welfare-to-work providers and 27 public welfare offices. The
state, itself, separates Wayne county administrative data from the other counties because of its
unique characteristics.
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Although prior research (Mitchell, Cadwin and Nightengale 1980; Mead 1985, 1988,
1997) utilizes administrative data from the employment-training system, this source does not
provide reliable data in Michigan, particularly concerning the macro- and micro-implementation
factors of primary importance here. Instead, the county-level data-set used in this analysis was
assembled from a number of sources. Data from the U.S. Census and other government sources
are used for a number of the environmental control variables, such as geography, unemployment
rate, and poverty rate. Administrative data from the public welfare system are utilized for one
independent measure of client characteristics and for the dependent variable examined. (See
Appendix A for a detailed definition of all variables.)
The measures of macro- and micro-implementation factors, however, come from
telephone interviews with the managers of local public welfare and welfare-to-work programs
conducted during fiscal year 1997. Ninety-eight managers who oversee all local public welfare
offices in the state were interviewed for this study, representing for a response rate of 100 percent
in this population. In addition, interviews with 106 local managers of welfare-to-work programs
were conducted, for a response rate of 93 percent. The phone interviews were structured and
opened ended, lasting between 45 and 60 minutes. Managers were asked uniform questions on a
range of topics, including organizational conditions, service technology, and interagency
collaboration efforts. The results of these interviews were typed into a word processing file,
checked for accuracy, and then transferred into a qualitative software analysis package, QSRNudist (Hannibal and Gahan 1998; Richards and Richards 1994), that facilitated the systematic
application of codes and consistency checks.

The results of this initial exploration were

presented in a descriptive policy report (author, 1998). To conduct the present analysis, the data
from these interviews were quantitatively summarized at the county level.
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Measures and Multivariate Model
To explore this research question, we utilized a logit regression model for grouped data
that provides generalized or weighted least squares estimates for the dependent variable (Zellner
and Lee 1965). In this model, the logit function is the log of the odds ratio:

æ pj
Log ç
ç
è1- p j


 = ß 0 + ß1 + e j
xj



When p j equals successes divided by population for the jth observation. In this model, weights
are proportional to n j p j (1 - p j ) . This model is appropriate when the available data are, in
reality, mean values for the underlying population. Ideally, micro-level data from a state-wide
sample of welfare recipients would be available for this analysis to explore how economic,
demographic, macro- and micro-implementation factors contributed to individuals’ ability to find
employment or leave welfare because of work. Such data, however, are not available. Instead,
this analysis considers aggregate data that represent these factors at the county-level. As a result,
the dependent variable is operationalized as the percentage of the county caseload who combined
welfare and work in an average month. Analyses of generalized least squares logit models reveal
that this model yields very close estimates to those obtained by individual-level data (Maddala
1983).
Although this analysis is primarily concerned with exploring whether implementation
conditions have any independent affect on this policy outcome, we have included some
environmental factors as control variables, representing factors outside of the influence of
implementing agents. Resembling the models used in prior research in this area (Brasher 1994;
Mitchell, Chadwin, and Nightingale 1980; Mead 1985, 1997), these environmental measures
include geography, local economic conditions, and demographic characteristics of the county and

10

welfare caseload. Specific variables are whether the county was urban, the unemployment rate,
the proportion of jobs in the manufacturing sector, the poverty rate, the proportion of the
population with a high school degree, the proportion of the population that are female headed
families, and the proportion of cash assistance cases that are white. (Additional details about
precise ways all variables are specified are provided in Appendix A.) Table 1 presents some
descriptive information about the county level variables used in this multivariate analysis. Ten of
the 82 counties are characterized as urban. The average county unemployment rate was 6.4
percent and 17 percent of the jobs were in the manufacturing sector. The average poverty rate
was 14.8 percent. In an average county, 75 percent of the adults had a high school degree and 12
percent were female headed families. Eighty-four percent of the welfare recipients in the average
county were white.
The macro-implementation variables explored in any such analysis must–by definition–be
appropriate to the particular policy context being investigated.

To select the appropriate

variables for examination in this analysis, I relied upon in-depth knowledge of Michigan’s
welfare system gleaned through prior investigations and analyses (author, 1997; author, 1998).
The macro-implementation variables represent the parameters which structure Michigan’s
welfare delivery system that are established by state and local administrators. They describe
county’s with unique public welfare services and the types of organizations administrators select
to operate the Work First program. Specifically, these variables denote whether the county was a
Project Zero site,5 the number of Work First operators in the county, the frequency of non-profit
organizations, and whether or not special Work First contracts were given in the county to serve
special populations of clients. Four counties in this analysis were designated as Project Zero
sites.6 The average number of Work First providers in a county was 1.5, with the number
varying from 1 to 12.

Because of this variation, the variables providing more detailed
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information about the welfare-to-work organizations in the county were constructed as a
proportion. Thus, rather than constructing a dummy variable to denote the presence or absence
of non-profit welfare-to-work programs, the variable represents the proportion of certain types of
organizations in the county.7

In an average county, 79 percent of the welfare-to-work

organizations were private non-profit agencies, 18 percent were schools, and two percent were
private for-profit firms. In the multivariate analysis, we utilize the variable denoting the intensity
of non-profit service providers in the county. In seven counties, special Work First contracts
existed to serve populations with particular barriers to entering the work force, such as pregnant
women or non-English speakers.
The final set of predictor variables examined in this analysis correspond to microimplementation factors within the organizations that provide welfare services in Michigan’s
counties. Given that Michigan’s the public welfare system is a centralized bureaucracy, there is
minimal variation in the service technology in that sector of the welfare system. As discussed
earlier, however, there is considerable diversity in the service technology used by Work First
contractors to move welfare recipients into the labor market; the variables used in this analysis
are designed to capture important dimensions of this variation across each county. In particular,
we explore the effects of immediate job search, skill-building workshops, and different types of
job search assistance provided to clients on the two outcomes of interest. Again, because there
are multiple welfare-to-work providers in each county, these dimensions are summarized at the
county level as the proportion of providers in that area which utilize various service technologies.
As Table 1 reflects, in an average county, 22 percent of the providers required immediate job
search from welfare recipients referred to their program. In contract, 77 percent of the programs
in an average county required clients to attend workshops on topics such as resume preparation or
workplace behavior. In an average county, 53 percent of the programs offered focused job search
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assistance to help clients find a job, including employing a staff member to actively develop
potential jobs for clients with local employers or bringing local employers on-site to meet with
potential employees. Thirty-two percent of the providers in an average county provided no such
job search assistance.
In this analysis these environmental characteristics, macro- and micro-implementation
variables are used to predict the proportion of a county’s cash assistance recipients combining
welfare and work. As other research has documented (Edin and Lein 1996; Spather-Roth et al.
1995), many welfare recipients “package” income from welfare and from their earnings. In fact,
Michigan’s welfare reform initiatives stressed this outcome and many policy reforms designed to
make “work pay” were instituted for clients receiving public assistance. The average monthly
proportion of clients reporting earned income during fiscal year 1997 was 43 percent. This rate
was considerably higher than the national average.8

Multivariate Results
I developed the model described above to explore whether or not implementation factors
have a statistically discernible effect on policy outcomes in the welfare system. I first examine
the relationship between the economic and demographic characteristics typically thought to be
related to the likelihood of welfare recipients combining welfare and work. I then consider
whether various macro-implementation decisions which establish the county’s service delivery
structure are related to the proportion of clients combining work and welfare. Finally, I examine
whether the micro-implementation factors, particularly the service technology used to move
welfare recipients into the labor force, have a quantifiable impact on this same outcome. The
results of these multivariate analyses are displayed in Tables 2and 3. 9
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As noted earlier, the majority of research on welfare outcomes has looked at individual–
level data rather than aggregate-data to explored whether not demographic characteristics and
local economic conditions influence welfare dynamics. Although this analysis uses aggregate
county-level data, I began this investigation by examining these same factors. I then include
them as control variables in all subsequent models.

As Table 2 reveals, the statistically

significant environmental factors are county unemployment rate and the proportion of
manufacturing jobs in the county. Both have a statistically discernible negative impact. The
proportion of female-headed families in the county is positively related to the outcome and
reflects the largest magnitude of any coefficient in this initial model. Finally, the proportion of
the cash assistance caseload that is white has a positive relationship.
The variable denoting the proportion of the caseload that is white has a large t-statistic
relative to the other factors. The strength of this relationship undoubtedly reflects omitted
variable bias since this variable is the only one that reflects the demographic characteristics of the
welfare caseload itself, rather than the demographic characteristics of the county as a whole.
Data providing more details about the demographic characteristics of welfare recipients, such as
proportion with a high school degree or average work experience, are not available on a countyby-county basis in Michigan. As a result, this variable is capturing not only the effect of race on
the likelihood a welfare recipient will be working but also unmeasured characteristics in the
welfare population as a whole.
These control variables were kept in the models as I explored my central question about
the effect of macro- and micro-implementation factors on the attainment of policy goals. Table 3
reports the results of the multivariate analysis when predicting the proportion of the caseload that
is working. First, I consider how the macro-implementation factors that form the service delivery
structure in Michigan’s counties are related to this outcome. Participation in the Project Zero
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pilot project is a statistically significant positive predictor in this model and in subsequent ones.
The number of Work First providers in the county is negatively related to the outcome, although
the magnitude of the marginal effect of this coefficient is very small. Neither the practice of
issuing specialized contracts to serve hard to employ clients nor the proportion of the contractors
that were non-profit are statistically related to the outcome.
The next series of models seeks to uncover whether micro-implementation factors–the
decisions made in local programs themselves–are related to the proportion of welfare recipients
who are working. As mentioned earlier, Michigan’s Work First approach to welfare-to-work is
focused on quick, labor-force attachment for clients. Within these parameters, managers and
staff in local programs make decisions about two dimensions of service technology; whether to
provide up-front service before clients begin looking for work and whether to provide support
while clients are actively searching for employment. Although it would be conceivable that local
economic conditions would influence the type of service technology adopted by a program–for
example, that tight labor markets would inspire programs to offer workshops to hone clients’ job
searching skills before they seek employment or that loose markets would make programs less
likely to offer on-going job search assistance–an earlier analysis of these data revealed that local
unemployment rates are not correlated with the particular service technology adopted by Work
First programs (author, 1998). In fact, frequently, there is significant variation in the service
technology used by Work First providers in the same county, even though they face the same
local economic environment.

As explained earlier, the variables in these models are

operationalized as the intensity of each service approach because of this intra-county variation.
Columns 2-4 on Table 3 demonstrate how different service technologies are related to the
outcome in the multivariate model. In the second column, I examine instances in which clients
are required to do their own, independent job search immediately when referred to the program
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and are given minimal programmatic support while they search for a job. With environmental
control and macro-implementation variables included in the model, this service technology has
no statistically discernible effect on the outcome. In the third column, I vary the type of service
technology and investigate programs that offer moderately more support to welfare recipients
searching for employment. These programs still require clients to immediately begin job search
but then provide focused job search assistance, in the form of on-site information sessions with
local employers, “job clubs” which provide peer support, or a staff member who actively
cultivates local job leads. As the table shows, this analysis finds that both components of service
technology have a negative effect on the proportion of a county’s caseload that is reporting
earned income. In fact, assuming this model is correctly specified, when the proportion of a
county’s providers using immediate job search increases by one percentage point, the proportion
of the caseload that is working decreases by 3.3 percentage points.

Similarly, when the

proportion of a county’s Work First providers using focused job search assistance techniques
increases by 1 percentage point, the proportion of the caseload working decreases by 2.8
percentage points.10
Lastly, I examine the relationship between a final type of service technology and the
proportion of a county’s caseload that is working. In this model, I include programs that provide
both initial workshops on job search techniques before they begin to look for employment and
on-going support while clients are searching for employment. Of the three approaches, this
combination offers the most assistance to welfare recipients searching for employment. As the
last column in Table 3 reflections, workshops prior to job search are positively related to the
outcome. Holding all other factors constant, when the proportion of a county’s Work First
providers offering workshops increases by one percentage point, the working welfare caseload
increases by 4.7 percentage points. As in the previous model, focused job search assistance is
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negatively related to this policy outcome.

Assuming this model is correctly specified, the

proportion of a county’s welfare population that is working decreases by 3.8 percentage points
with every one unit increase in the proportion of Work First providers offering this type of
assistance.
In analysis not presented here in tabular form, variables representing various workshop
topics were substituted for the more general workshop variable listed in column 4.

The

proportion of the providers offering workshops on specific job seeking skills–interview
techniques, resume preparation, application completion, and cover letter construction–was a
statistically significant positive predictor of the proportion of welfare recipients combining
welfare and work. Some Work First programs, though, provide instruction in other topics.
Because managers and staff believe that understanding the rules of the workplace is important to
finding jobs in the low wage labor market (Holzer 1996; Moss and Tilly 1996), some programs
include workshops on “soft skills,” such as the importance of proper dress, punctuality, and
general workplace behavior. In the models used for this analysis, however, these types of
programs have a statistically significant negative effect on the proportion of a county’s welfare
caseload that is working. Still other programs run workshops that try to improve clients’ problem
management skills. Because of the challenges of problem management and of low-self esteem
(Herr, et al, 1995; Pavetti, et al, 1996), these programs try to increase clients’ abilities to function
more effectively. For example, they may do simulations that help clients to think through what
they would do if their babysitter cancels during their second week of work, do role plays that
help clients value their skills as parents, or exercises designed to increase their motivation for
work. In the models used for this analysis, the proportion of these types of workshops offered in
a county is a statistically significant, positive predictor of the proportion of welfare recipients
reporting earned income.
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In all of the models used to predict this outcome, the two variables denoting service
delivery structure remain statistically significant. The number of Work First providers in the
county is consistently a negative predictor of the proportion of clients who are working.
However, in all models, the magnitude of the coefficient is quite small.11 In contrast, counties
designated as a Project Zero pilot site have statistically significant positive relationships of
sizable magnitude with this outcome. In fact, if the model used in this analysis is correctly
specified, being a Project Zero site increases the proportion of a county’s caseload that is
working by 13.4 to 13.7 percentage points, holding all other factors constant. In the county with
the mean outcome, this would entail an increase of 32 percent of the proportion of the caseload
that is working.

Discussion and Implications
This exploratory analysis was undertaken for two purposes. For one, it was intended to
add to our understanding about the various elements of program implementation in the devolved
welfare system. Now that cash assistance recipients have time-limited eligibility, there are a
growing array of techniques designed to move welfare recipients into the labor market. Since
decision making has devolved to state and local managers about both service delivery structure
and service technology used to move welfare recipients to work, it is important to explore
whether or not these decisions have any quantifiable impact on policy outcomes. Secondly, this
paper sets out a conceptual framework for exploring how these macro- and microimplementation factors are related to these outcomes. This exploratory model has potential for
enriching what we learn about the multiple level and factors involved in the implementation of
social welfare programs.
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Before considering both of these purposes, in turn, let us first summarize the results of
this examination.

As would be expected, there are many forces outside the influence of

implementing agents that predict how many welfare recipients in a county report earnings from
work.

Geography, economic conditions, and demographic characteristics are all significant

factors that influences how a county stands on this important policy goal. What this analysis
reveals, however, is that the decisions made by implementing agents also have a statistically
discernible relationship to this outcome.
In the multivariate analysis, the county’s designation as a Project Zero site and it’s
number of Work First providers were consistently statistically significant predictors. The Project
Zero finding is particularly striking because of the relatively large magnitude of its marginal
effect. From July 1996 to June of 1997, the counties selected to participate in Project Zero were
focused on the goal of reducing the number of welfare recipients who were not employed twenty
hours a week to zero. To work toward this vision, the sites were given additional resources. In
particular, they were allotted extra resources to address clients’ child care and transportation
barriers and three of six offered mentoring services. The Project Zero sites also were the pilot for
a substantial reorientation of the public welfare office.

These counties were the initial

implementation sites for Michigan’s new classification of front-line welfare workers, “Family
Independence Specialists.”

Although not fully implemented during this first year, the idea

behind the new position was to transform front-line staff from mere eligibility workers more
professional case-managers who would help families move into employment.12 At a minimum,
when clients applied for assistance in a Project Zero site they were given a clear message about
the importance of finding work and relying on cash assistance temporarily. Unfortunately, there
is not data to explore which of these micro-implementation factors of the Project Zero
intervention–the increased child care and transportation, the mentoring program, the altered role
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of front-line workers, or the interactions in the public welfare office that stressed work–is related
to the quantifiable effect on the outcome examined in this paper. This analysis does show,
however, that the environment created by this pilot program had an statistically detectable on the
proportion of the county’s caseload that was working, even when controlling for other
environmental factors.
The consistently negative, albeit small, effect of the county’s number of Work First
providers reveals that more providers do not move larger proportions of the welfare caseload into
employment. This is probably because of the complexity introduced into the system by larger
numbers of programs. In the decentralized Work First system, there are few ways to standardize
the message clients receive about policies to encourage work, to accurately monitor clients’
participation in the Work First program, or to assure that efficient coordination occurs between
the various organizations involved in implementation (Author, forthcoming).

These factors

seeming detract from the ability of a county to move clients to work.
Like most studies of welfare implementation, the findings of this paper are not strictly
generalizable to other states other; however, this analysis does provide some empirical evidence
about the relationship between service technology and the goal of moving welfare recipients into
work.

Although conventional wisdom abounds, there is relatively little empirical evidence

linking Work First service technology to policy outcomes. Building on comparisons of various
welfare-to-work program evaluations in the last 15 years (Gueron and Pauly 1991), the
Manpower Demonstration Research Corporation has written a technical assistance guide for
states that stresses that workshops and ongoing support while clients are engaged in job search
are the “best practices” for Work First programs (Brown 1997). Other analysts conclude that job
search assistance, particularly an individual job developer, is more beneficial than clients’
independent job search (Herr et al. 1996; Westat 1997).
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Among the counties in Michigan, independent job search with minimal programmatic
support has no impact on the proportion of a county’s welfare caseload that finds employment.
This is consistent with the recommendation by others in the field that this approach is not the
most effective at helping welfare recipients to find employment. When investigating the various
ways of supporting job search, I find that the proportion of programs with workshop sessions has
a positively effect on the percentage of county’s welfare caseload that is working. In particular,
workshops stressing job seeking skills–such as interview techniques, resume preparation, or
cover letter preparation–and problem management techniques seem to be particularly useful.
Again, these findings reinforce conventional wisdom about the types of useful services to include
in Work First programs.
One finding of this analysis, however, contradicts widely accepted practices. In our
models, the proportion of a county’s programs that use job search assistance–such as on-site
employer information sessions, job clubs that offer peer support, or job development staff–is
negatively related to the county’s working caseload. There are a couple of potential explanations
for this finding. In interviews with local Work First managers, a sizable minority voiced their
belief that continued job search assistance is not necessary; these managers argued that clients
who do their own search are more committed to the jobs they accept and more able to look for
another job when the first one ends. Another potential explanation is that programs offering
continued support are not reaching out to employers who are the right match for their clients’
skills or employment preferences. In a second wave of data from this study of local programs,
we are collecting more comprehensive data that will allow us to better identify which employers
are being targeted and what types of relationships Work First programs cultivate with them. This
additional information will allow for more exploration of the potential source of the negative
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relationship between the intensity of these services and the proportion of a county’s caseload that
it working.
Implications for Further Research
When combined with past research, this paper provides growing evidence that
implementation factors do have a statistically discernible effect on policy outcomes.

This

conclusion underscores the significance of implementation factors, particularly in social
programs where important decision-making responsibilities are passed to states and localities.
The ways social policy is implemented matters not only because it influences how programs are
shaped, how staff interact with clients, and how clients understand program rules. This analysis
and others suggest that the implementation of welfare programs also matters because it has an
independent effect on a county’s policy outcomes.
Although this paper suggests that implementation influences policy outcomes, there are
limitations to this case study. For one, the model is exploratory, and not all potentially important
implementation elements are operationalized. An important macro-implementation variable not
included in the model is the amount of financial resources allotted to each county for welfare-towork services. In addition, an important micro-implementation variable not included is the
county’s sanction rates for non-compliance. Given the emphasis in recent law on mandatory
participation in these programs, it would be interesting to know if variations in the rate of
sanction imposition had any discernible effect on policy outcomes. Finally, as states give more
discretion to front-line staff in the public welfare office, additional measures of

micro-

implementation factors will be important to include in multivariate models.13
Secondly, better specification of certain measures would be desirable. As pointed out
earlier, the micro-implementation variables representing the types of service technology used by
welfare-to-work programs is summarized at the county level as the proportion of the providers
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who use each approach. Ideally, these measures would be adjusted to reflect the proportion of a
county’s caseload that receives each approach. In addition, better control variables that denote
the human capital characteristics of the welfare caseload, such as level of education, work
experience, or work level, would be desirable.
Finally, other important policy outcomes could be explored with such models.

For

example, county’s participation rate in employment activities–an important outcome given the
federal TANF requirements–would be an important outcome to explore. The proportion of the
caseload employed for 90 days or leaving the welfare rolls would be additional important
outcomes to investigate with such a model. In this paper, I could not address any of these
concerns— limited implementation variables, specification of certain variables, and restricted
outcomes–because of data limitations. Future research should strive to address these issues.
In spite of these qualifiers, this paper provides an exploratory examination of how macroand micro-implementation conditions are related to policy outcomes in the welfare system. The
distinction used here between these two-levels of implementation will be important as we try to
understand how programs are refined and delivered in the devolved welfare system. The service
delivery structure established by state and local administrators creates the parameters within
which programs are implemented. It establishes the resources allocated to various counties, the
number and type of local organizations involved in service provision, and the efforts made to
assist sub-populations that might face substantial barriers to sustaining employment. At the
micro-level, the service technology used by organizations to assist clients is crucially important
because it is, at this level, that policy ideals are operationalized and developed into specific
interventions. Quantitative models that separate these two-levels of implementation will help us
to better tease apart what decisions are important in helping states and counties move toward the
goal of reforming the welfare system.
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1.

In a preliminary paper, Jennings and Ewalt (1998) offer initial evidence from a survey of
state TANF administrators that macro-implementation activities are correlated with the
administrators’articulated goal of welfare reform.

2.

The federal Work Incentive Program operated from 1967 to 1988 and was administered at
the local level by employment security agencies and public welfare departments.

3.

In 1988, the federal government passed the Family Support Act which was a prior attempt
to reform the welfare system. The welfare-to-work initiative was called Jobs Opportunity
and Basic Skills (JOBS) program and stressed human capital development through
education and training.

4.

During the last three months of fiscal year 1997, for example, a reduction in grants was
made on only 0.2 to 0.3 percent of the state’s caseload.

5.

In 1996, Michigan implemented the pilot project, “Project Zero,” in six sites with the goal
of reducing the number of welfare cases without earned income to zero. Additional
information about the scope of the initiative is explained later in the paper. In addition,
see Seefeldt, Sandfort and Danziger (1997).

6.

Because the two other Project Zero sites were in Wayne county, they are excluded from
this analysis.

7.

While it would be desirable to have these variables adjusted for the proportion of the
county’s caseload served by a particular type of provider, this data was not available
systematically for all counties in the state.

8.

The most recent national data available is from fiscal year 1995. In that year, Michigan
had the second highest rate among states of clients combining welfare and work at 23
percent (this included Wayne county which is not included in this analysis). This rate
compared to a national average of 9.5 percent.
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9.

Like other prior research in this area (Mead 1997; Riccio and Hasenfeld 1997), we’ve
elected to utilize a p-value less than or equal to 0.10 to designate statistical significance in
these exploratory models.

10.

Because of the estimation model used, the coefficients reported in Table 3 is not directly
reflective of the magnitude of the marginal effects. To calculate the magnitude, these
coefficients were transformed using the following derived formula: y(1- y )ß .

11.

The marginal effect of this variable is between 0.37 and 0.62 percentage points in all
models.

12.

See Seefeldt, Sandfort and Danziger (1998) for more details about the initial
implementation of this initiative.

13.

An example of some such factors can be found in Riccio and Hasenfeld (1996) and
Hasenfeld and Weaver (1996).
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APPENDIX A.
Outcome of interest
Working recipients

Regional Characteristics
Urban

DEFINITION OF VARIABLES

The average monthly proportion of current cash assistance recipients with earned
income, October 1996-September 1997.

1= urban (when more than 70% of population live in an urban area) 0= rural

Unemployment rate

Average monthly county unemployment rate, October 1996-September 1997.

Manufacturing sector

Proportion of jobs in manufacturing sector, 1993 Bureau of Economic Analysis.

Poverty rate

Proportion of individuals below federal poverty line, 1994 Current Population Survey.

High school degree

Proportion of adult population with high school degree, 1990 census.

Female-headed family

Proportion of female-headed families, 1990 census.

White

Proportion of cash assistance recipients who are white, June 1997.

Service Delivery Structure (Macro-implementation factors)
Project Zero
1= counties designated Project Zero program sites 0= counties not designated Project
Zero sites
Work First providers

Number of Work First providers in the county.

Non-profit agency

Proportion of Work First providers in the county that are non-profit.

Specialized contractors

1= counties in which Work First contracts were awarded to serve populations with
special barriers to employment such as pregnant women people with limited English
proficiency and those unable to find work through typical job search techniques. 0=
counties in which such contracts did not exist.

Service Delivery Process (Micro-implementation factors)
Immediate job search
Proportion of Work First providers in the county that had clients immediately search
for employment.
Job seeking skills

Proportion of Work First providers in the county that provided classroom instruction
in resume preparation, application completion, and interviewing techniques

Soft skills

Proportion of Work First providers in the county offering classroom instruction in
“soft skills” such as dress, punctuality, and rules of the workplace.

Problem management
skills

Proportion of Work First providers in the county that offered training to improve
problem-solving skills and boost self-esteem.

Focused job search
assistance

Proportion of Work First providers in the county that offered one or more of the
following services: a staff position devoted to job development, employers on-site
visits or an organized peer group to support job search efforts.

No job search assistance

Proportion of Work First providers in the county that provided no job search
assistance

Workshops

Proportion of Work First providers in the county that offered clients classroom
instruction to assist in job search efforts.

Table 1. Means and Standard Deviations of Model Variables
Variable
Environmental controls
Urban
Unemployment rate
Manufacturing
Poverty rate
High school degree
Female-headed family
White
Service delivery structure
Project Zero
Work first providers
Non-profit agency
Specialized contractor
Service Technology
Immediate job search
Job seeking skills
Soft skills
Problem management skills
No job search assistance
Focused job search assistance
Workshops
Working recipients
Source: Computed by author.

Mean

Standard Deviation

0.1220
6.4408
0.1722
14.8573
0.7494
0.1242
0.8442

0.3292
2.6416
0.0812
3.9807
0.0557
0.0269
0.1829

0.0488
1.4756
0.7868
0.0854

0.2167
1.4421
0.3628
0.2811

0.2189
0.7791
0.2185
0.4130
0.3224
0.5362
0.7689

0.4016
0.3992
0.3845
0.4708
0.4450
0.4724
0.4099

0.4312

0.0783

Table 2. The Effect of Environmental Controls on the
Proportion of a County’s Welfare Caseload Working
Environmental Controls
Urban

-0.0343
(0.0732)

Unemployment

-0.0309*
(0.0183)

Manufacturing

-1.2059***
(0.3757)

Poverty

0.0155
(0.0114)

High school degree

0.6854
(0.7806)

Female-headed family

2.1544*
(1.2407)

White

0.9946***
(0.1720)

Sample size (n)
Adjusted R2
*
p<.10; **p < .05;
Source:

82
0.4767
***

p < .01.

Table 3. The Effect of Macro- and Micro-Implementation Factors
on the Proportion of a County’s Caseload that is Workinga
Predictors
Service Delivery Structure
Project Zero
Work first providers
Non-profit agency
Specialized contractor

1
0.5602***
(0.1370)
-0.0152*
(0.0084)
-0.0532
(0.0631)
0.6036
(0.0593)

2

3

0.5474***
(0.1387)
-0.0156*
(0.0084)
-0.0538
(0.0633)
0.0616
(0.0600)

0.5517***
(0.1347)
-0.0194**
(0.0085)
-0.0217
(0.0642)
0.0974
(0.0612)

-0.0829
(0.0677)
0.0062
(0.0721)

-0.1343*
(0.0697)

4
0.5604***
(0.1310)
-0.0257***
(0.0087)
-0.0459
(0.0623)
0.0831
(0.0590)

Service Technology
Immediate job search
No job search assistance
Focused job search assistance
Workshops

-0.1113*
(0.0611)

-0.1535**
(0.0635)
0.1901***
(0.0694)

Sample size (n)
82
82
82
82
Adjusted R2
0.5825
0.5800
0.5995
0.6197
*
p < .10; **p < .05; ***p < .01.
a
The above models include control variables not shown for environmental factors outside of the control
of program implementers.
Source:

References
Author. Forthcoming. “The Structural Impediments to Human Service Collaboration: The Case
of Welfare Reform,” Social Service Review.
Author. 1997. Peering Into the “Black Box:” A Study of the Front-Line Organizations
Implementing Welfare Reform in Michigan. Unpublished doctoral dissertation.
Bane, Mary Jo and David Ellwood. 1994. Welfare Realities: From Rhetoric to Reform.
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Bardach, Eugene. 1977. The Implementation Game. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Berman, Paul. 1978. “The Study of Macro- and Micro- Implementation,” Public Policy, 26(2):
157-184.
Brasher, C. Nielsen. 1994. “Workfare in Ohio: Political and Socioeconomic Climate and
Program Impact,” Policy Studies Journal, 22(3): 514-527.
Brodkin, Evelyn. 1977. “Inside the Welfare Contract: Discretion and Accountability in State
Welfare Administration,” Social Service Review (March): 1-33.
Brodkin, Evelyn. 1986. The False Promise of Administrative Reform: Implementing Quality
Control in Welfare. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.
Brodkin, Evelyn. 1987. “Policy Politics: If We Can’t Govern, Can We Manage?” Political
Science Quarterly, 102(4): 571-587.
Brodkin, Evelyn. 1990. “Implementation as Policy Politics.” In Dennis Palumbo and Donald
Calista (eds.), Implementation and the Policy Process. New York: Greenwood Press.
Brown, Amy. 1997. “Work First: How to Implement an Employment-Focused Approach to
Welfare Reform,” mimeo, ReWorking Welfare Series.
New York: Manpower
Demonstration Research Corporation, March.
Burtless, Gary. 1997. “Employment Prospects of Welfare Recipients.” In Demetra Nightingale
and Robert Haveman (eds.), The Work Alternative. Washington, DC: Urban Institute
Press.
Corbett, Thomas. 1994/95. “Changing the Culture of Welfare,” Focus 16(2): 12-22.
Duncan, Greg and Saul Hoffman. 1988. “The Use and Effects of Welfare: A Survey of Recent
Evidence,” Social Service Review (June): 238-257.
Edin, Kathryn and Laura Lein. 1996. Making Ends Meet: How Single Mothers Survive Welfare
and Low Wage Work. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.

30

Gallagher, L. Jerome, Megan Gallagher, Kevin Perese, Susan Schreiber, and Kevin Watson.
1998. “One Year After Welfare Reform: A Description of State Temporary Assistance
for Needy Families (TANF) Decisions as of October 1997.” Washington, DC: The Urban
Institute, May.
Goggin, Malcolm L., Ann O’M. Bowman, James P. Lester, and Laurence O’Toole, Jr. 1998.
Implementation Theory and Practice: Toward a Third Generation. New York: Harper
Collins.
Gueron, Judith and Edward Pauly. 1991. From Welfare to Work. New York: Russell Sage
Foundation.
Hagan, Jan, Irene Lurie, and Ling Wang. 1993. Implementing JOBS: The Perspective of Front
Line Workers,. The Nelson Rockefeller Institute of Government. Albany, NY: State
University of New York, June.
Hannibal, Mike and Celia Gahan. 1998.
Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications.

Doing Qualitative Research Using QSR Nudist.

Hasenfeld, Yeheskel and Dale Weaver. 1996. “Enforcement, Compliance, and Disputes in
Welfare-To-Work Programs,” Social Service Review, 70(2) (June): 235-236.
Hasensfeld, Yeheskel. 1997. “Organizational Forms as Morality Plays: The Case of Welfare
Departments.” Paper presented at Human Service Organizations’ Environmental
Uncertainty conference, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, April.
Herr, Toby, Suzanne Wagner, and Robert Halpern. 1996. “Making the Shoe Fit: Creating a
Work-Prep System for a Large and Diverse Population.” Chicago: Project Match and the
Erikson Institute.
Holcomb, Pamela A., LaDonna Pavetti, Caroline Ratcliffe, and Susan Riedinger. 1998.
“Building an Employment Focused Welfare System: Work First and Other WorkOriented Strategies in Five States.” Washington, DC: The Urban Institute, June.
Holzer, Harry. 1996. What Employers Want: Job Prospects for Less Educated Workers. New
York: Russell Sage.
Ingram, Helen. “Implementation: A Review and Suggested Framework.” In Naomi Lynn and
Aaron Wildavsky (eds.), Public Administration: The State of the Discipline. New Jesey:
Chatham House.
Jennings, Edward T., Jr. and Jo Ann G. Ewalt. 1998. “Policy Choices, Goals, Priorities, and
Implementation Activities: The States and The Temporary Assistance for Needy Families
Act.” Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science
Association, Boston, Massachusetts, September 3-6, 1998.

31

Kane, Thomas and Mary Jo Bane. 1994. “The Context of Welfare Reform.” In Mary Jo Bane
and David T. Ellwood (eds.), Welfare Realities: From Rhetoric to Reform. Cambridge,
Massachusetts: Harvard University Press
Lipsky, Michael. 1980. Street-Level Bureaucracy: Dilemmas of the Individual in Public
Services. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.
Maddala, G.S. 1983. Limited Dependent and Qualitative Variable in Econometrics. Cambridge,
MA: Cambridge University Press.
Martinson, Karin. 1995. “Review of the Research Evidence on Employment, Education and
Training, and Work Programs for Welfare Recipients,” Technical Analysis Paper, Office
of the Assistant Secretary for Planning and Evaluation, Department of Health and Human
Services, June.
Matland, Richard E. 1995. “Synthesizing the Implementation Literature: The Ambiguity
Conflict Model of Policy Implementation,” Journal of Public Administration Research
and Theory 5(2): 145-174.
Mazmanian, Daniel and Paul Sabatier. 1989. Implementation and Public Policy. Lantham,
Maryland: University Press of America.
Mead, Lawrence. 1997. “Optimizing JOBS: Evaluation Versus Administration,” Public
Administration Review, 57(2) (March/April): 113-122.
Mead, Lawrence. 1985. “Expectations and Welfare Work: WIN in New York State,” Polity, 18,
225-252.
Mead, Lawrence. 1983. “Expectations and Welfare Work: WIN in New York City,” Policy
Studies Review 2(4) (May): 448-662.
Mead, Lawrence. “The Potential for Work Enforcement in WIN,” Journal of Policy Analysis
and Management, 7(2): 264-288.
Meyers, Marcia, Bonnie Glaser, and Karin MacDonald. 1998. “On the Front Lines of Welfare
Delivery: Are Workers Implementing Policy Reforms?” Journal of Policy Analysis and
Management, 17(1) (June): 1-22.
Miller, Gale. 1991. Enforcing the Work Ethic: Rhetoric and Everyday Life in a Work Incentive
Program. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press.
Milward, Brinton and Keith G. Provan. 1993. “The Hollow State: Private Provision for Public
Service.” In Helen Ingram and Steven Rathgeb Smith (eds.), Public Policy for
Democracy. Washington, DC: Brookings Institute.
Mitchell, John, Mark L. Chadwin, and Demetra Smith Nightingale. 1980 Implementing Welfare
Employment Programs: An Institutional Analysis of the Work Incentive (WIN) Program.

32

R&D Monograph 78, U.S. Department of Labor. Washington, DC: U.S. Government
Printing Office.
Moss, Philip and Chris Tilly. 1996. “Soft Skills and Race: An Investigation of Black Men’s
Employment Problems,” Work and Occupations, 23(3) 252-276.
Moffit, Robert. 1992. “Incentive Effects of the U.S. Welfare System,” Journal of Economic
Literature, 30 (March): 1-61.
Nathan, Richard P. and Thomas Gais. 1998. “Overview Report: Implementation of the Personal
Responsibility Act of 1996,” Working Paper, Federalism Research Group, Nelson A
Rockefeller Institute of Government. Albany: State University of New York.
Palumbo, Dennis J. and Donald J. Calista. 1990. Implementation and the Policy Process:
Opening up the Black Box. New York: Greenwood Press.
Pavetti, LaDonna and Amy-Ellen Duke. 1995. Increasing Participation in Work and WorkRelated Activities: Lessons from Five State Welfare Reform Demonstration Projects.
Washington, DC: Urban Institute, September.
Pressman, Jeffrey L. and Aaron Wildavsky. 1973. Implementation. Berkeley: University of
California Press.
Riccio, James and Yeheskel Hasenfeld. 1996. “Enforcing Participation Mandate in a Welfareto-Work Program,” Social Service Review, 70(4) (December): 516-539.
Richards, Thomas and Lyn Richards. 1994. “From Filing Cabinets to Computer.” In A.
Bryman and R. Burgess (eds.), Analyzing Qualitative Data. London: Routledge.
Seefeldt, Kristin, Jodi Sandfort, and Sandra Danziger. 1998. Moving Towards a Vision of
Family Independence: Local Managers’Views of Michigan’s Welfare Reforms, Michigan
Program on Poverty and Social Welfare Policy. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan.
www.ssw.umich.edu/poverty/report
Seefeldt, Kristin, Jodi Sandfort, and Sandra Danziger. 1997. Project Zero: The View from the
Sites, University of Michigan Program on Poverty and Social Welfare Policy. Ann
Arbor, MI: University of Michigan.
Smith, Steven Rathgeb and Michael Lipsky. 1993. Non-Profits for Hire: The Welfare State in
the Age of Contracting. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Spalter-Roth, Roberta, Beverly Burr, Heidi Hartmann, and Lois Shaw. 1995. Welfare That
Works: The Working Lives of AFDC Recipients. Washington, DC: The Institute for
Women’s Policy Research.
Wiseman, Michael. 1996. “State Strategies for Welfare Reform: The Wisconsin Story,” Journal
of Public Policy Analysis and Management, 19(4): 515-546.

33

Wiseman, Michael. 1993. “Welfare Reform in the States: the Bush Legacy,” Focus, 15(1)
(Spring): 18-36.
Zellner, Arnold and Tong Hun Lee. 1965. “Joint Estimation of Relationships Involving Discrete
Random Variables,” Econometrica, 33(2) (April): 382.

34

INCOME SECURITY POLICY SERIES
Policy Series Papers
Policy
Paper

Title

Author(s)

Date

1

W(h)ither the Middle Class? A Dynamic View Duncan, Smeeding, and
Rodgers

February 1992

2

Reality or Illusion: The Importance of
Creaming on Job Placement Rates in Job
Training Partnership Act Programs

Anderson, Burkhauser,
and Raymond

February 1992

3

Modeling Application for Disability Insurance
as a Retirement Decision: A Hazard Model
Approach Using Choice-Based Sampling

Burkhauser, Butler, Kim, February 1992
and Slotsve

4

How People with Disabilities Fare When
Public Policies ChangeC Past, Present, and
Future

Burkhauser, Haveman,
and Wolfe

February 1992

5

Disability or Work: Handicap Policy Choices

Burkhauser

February 1992

6

A Cautionary Tale of European Disability
Policies: Lessons for the United States

Aarts, Burkhauser, and
de Jong

February 1992

7

The Importance of Employer Accommodation Burkhauser, Butler, and
on the Job Duration of Workers with
Kim
Disabilities: A Hazard Model Approach

December 1992

8

Public Policies for the Working Poor: The
Earned Income Tax Credit Versus Minimum
Wage Legislation

February 1994

9

Transitions between Child Care Arrangements Ondrich and Spiess
for German Pre-Schoolers

April 1995

10

Putting the Minimum Wage Debate in a
Historical Context: Card and Krueger Meet
George Stigler

Burkhauser, Couch, and
Wittenburg

June 1995

11

Slow Motion: Economic Mobility of Young
Workers in the 1970s and 1980s

Duncan, Boisjoly, and
Smeeding

September 1995

12

Work, Welfare, and the Burden of Disability:
Caring for Special Needs of Children in Poor
Families

Meyers, Lukemeyer, and
Smeeding

April 1996

13

Recounting Winners and Losers in the 1980s:
A Critique of Income Distribution
Measurement Methodology

Burkhauser, Crews, and
Daly

August 1996

Burkhauser and Glenn

Policy Series Papers (Continued)
Policy
Paper

Title

Author(s)
Burkhauser, Couch, and
Wittenburg

Date

14

Who Minimum Wage Increases Bite: An
Analysis Using Monthly Data from the SIPP
and CPS

January 1997

15

Labor Earnings and Household Income
Hauser and Fabig
Mobility in Reunified Germany: A Comparison
of the Eastern and Western States

May 1997

16

The Cost of Caring: Childhood Disability and
Poor Families

Meyers, Lukemeyer, and
Smeeding

July 1997

17

Expensive Children in Poor Families: Out-ofPocket Expenditures for the Care of Disabled
and Chronically Ill Children and Welfare
Reform

Lukemeyer, Meyers, and August 1997
Smeeding

18

How the Fruits of Growth Were Distributed
Among Working-Age Families in the United
States and Germany in the 1980s

Burkhauser, Crews, and
Daly

August 1997

19

Horatio Alger Meets the Mobility Tables

Holtz-Eakin, Rosen, and
Weathers

July 1998

20

Exploring the Effect of Welfare Reform
Implementation on the Attainment of Policy
Goals: An Examination of Michigan’s
Counties

Sandfort

April 1999

